- User-to-user PMs now use a server-derived shared room key (HMAC-SHA256)
instead of each user's personal PBKDF2 key (which differed per user,
making cross-user decryption impossible)
- Server sends room_key in pm_ready, pm_invite, and pm/history responses
- crypto.js: add importKeyBase64() for importing server-provided keys
- chat.js: use sharedKey for encrypt/decrypt in user-to-user PMs
- Violet AI transit encryption still uses personal key (unchanged)
- PM history decryption now handles errors gracefully per-message
- Encodes otherUser in history URL to prevent injection
- Only emit pm_invite when target_sid exists (real user)
- Violet has no socket session, so emitting to None would broadcast
to all connected clients, leaking who is chatting with the AI
- Payment endpoint no longer uses @_require_auth (not client-callable)
- Identifies user from webhook payload user_id instead of client JWT
- Removed hardcoded payment secret from chat.js
- Client now shows placeholder message directing to admin
- Webhook secret + user_id must come from payment provider server
- Track pending PM invitations per socket session
- pm_accept now rejects room joins unless user has a valid invite
- Clean up pending invites on disconnect
- Prevents eavesdropping on other users' PM conversations
- Create config.py with shared constants, AES-GCM helpers, and JWT helpers
- app.py and routes.py now import from the single source of truth
- Eliminates JWT secret mismatch (routes.py had hardcoded default)
- Removes all duplicate _issue_jwt, _verify_jwt, _aesgcm_encrypt,
_aesgcm_decrypt definitions
- start.py also uses shared config loader
3nd3r
Antigravity
computertech312